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1Abstract
This paper addresses the eﬃciency of the European banking sector in the ﬁve-year period
following the implementation of the Second Banking Directive of the European Union (EU).
We ﬁrst determine the degree of cost eﬃciency of EU banks in the period 1993-1997. After
that we explore to what extent eﬃcient European banks are managed diﬀerently than their
ineﬃcient peers. Our datasets comprise 5 years of observations on 1347 savings banks and
873 commercial banks, and we use the new Recursive Thick Frontier Approach method
to establish our results. We ﬁnd that structural factors such as technological progress
or increased bank competition have lowered the cost base of banks by about 5 percent
annually in the sample period. Managerial inability to control costs is at 17-25 percent the
main source of bank ineﬃciency in the EU. Managerial eﬃciency varies a great deal within
Europe, and there seems to be no tendency towards convergence. We detect economies to
scale for small savings banks. The savings bank sector as a whole can cut costs by about
3 percent through mergers of small savings banks.
JEL: D20, G21,L 11, L23. Keywords: banking, cost eﬃciency, economies of scale,
technological progress.1I n t r o d u c t i o n
On 1 January 1993 the Second Banking Directive of the EU1 and a number of the other key
EU directives2 related to the ﬁnancial service industry were implemented. This heralded
a new episode of deregulation with a standardized procedure to acquire a banking license,
standardized capital requirements, and standardized supervision rules. The general belief
among bankers and academics is that competition in European banking has signiﬁcantly
increased in this changed environment. Indeed, as from 1 January 1993, European banks
virtually compete on a level playing ﬁeld, whereas before it was perhaps diﬃcult to speak of
a single EU banking sector. Apart from the major change in the regulatory and competitive
environment, the banking industry has been aﬀected by the availability of new computer
and telecommunications technologies.
Some immediate questions that arise from the general picture above are: Have bankers
reshaped their businesses into leaner (more cost eﬃcient) institutions in order to face
increased competitive pressure? Have banks moved into new strategies and products at
the time in which traditional income streams such as interest rate margins have perhaps
dried up? What has happened to the sector’s proﬁtability and viability after 1992? Answers
to these questions help bankers to choose the right strategy for their institution. It also
provides important feedback to regulators on the importance and the eﬃcacy of their work.
Finally, it helps to outline the shape of the future ﬁnancial services market in the EU.
This study addresses some of the important questions above. First, through a cost
1Council Directive 89/646/EEC. The most important provisions of the directive are: (1) harmonised
rules regarding the banking license (Articles 4-7), (2) harmonised mandate for regulation (Articles 10-17),
and (3) mutual recognition, i.e. freedom of establishment in EU member states other than the home
member state (Articles 18-21).
2Namely, the Money Laundering Directive (91/308/EEC), the Own Funds Directive (89/299/EEC),
the Solvency Ratio Directive (89/647/EEC), the Consolidated Supervision Directive (92/30/EEC), and
the Deposit-guarantee Directive (94/19/EC). The Large Exposures Directive (92/121/EEC), the Capital
Adequacy Directive (C152/6/EEC), and the Investment Services Directive (93/22/EEC), came into force
in 1994, 1996 and 1996 respectively.
1frontier analysis we study developments in X-eﬃciency, returns to scale, and the impact of
structural developments of EU banks in the period 1993-1997. We pay special attention on
the questions whether, as predicted above, bank eﬃciency has increased due to increased
competitive pressure, and whether the cost base for banks has come down due to struc-
tural factors. Secondly, we identify possible diﬀerences between the strategies of eﬃcient
and ineﬃcient banks. We perform our study on two diﬀerent bank samples, namely EU
savings banks and EU commercial banks. This choice is inspired by initial ﬁndings that
demonstrate important diﬀerences between these two bank types, and by Altunbas and
Chakravarty (1998)’s point that diﬀerent types of banking institutions play a distinct role
in the ﬁnancial system of the EU.
Our ﬁndings are the following. First, structural developments such as technological
progress, or increased competition in banking, have had a notable impact on the EU
banking sector. After accounting for changes in output levels and input prices, we ﬁnd
that both EU savings banks and EU commercial banks lowered their cost base in the
period 1993-1997 at an annual pace of about 5 percent. This result conﬁrms the recent
ﬁndings of Altunbas, Gardener, Molyneux, and Moore (2001) and Carbo, Gardener, and
Williams (2001). US evidence on structural developments in the same time period reveals
small or even negative eﬀects of structural developments.3
Second, we conﬁrm the standard result for both EU and US banks that managerial
ability to control costs (X-ineﬃciency) is at 17-25 percent the main source of ineﬃciency.4
By contrast, the savings bank sector can reduce costs by about 3 percent by exploit-
ing potential economies of scale.5 Managers of large commercial banks are on average
3In particular, in his study on 661 big banks in the period 1991-1997, Stiroh (2000) ﬁnds annual cost
improvements of about 0 to 0.5 percent. Berger and Mester (2001), who also take into account general
business conditions in the sector, ﬁn dt h a tt h ec o s tb a s eo fb e s tp r a c t i c eb a n k sincreased by about 1 percent
annually over the same time period. They ﬁnd an even worse cost ﬁgure for their entire set of banks, but,
at the same time, also ﬁnd that US banks improved in terms of proﬁtability.
4An important survey of the empirical literature is Berger and Humphrey (1997).
5Carbo, Gardener, and Williams (2002) is the only other cross-country study of EU savings banks. They
2more successful in controlling costs than managers of small commercial banks. A simi-
lar relationship does not hold for savings banks. A possible reason for this is that large
commercial banks are more often publicly listed so that management is subject to more
extensive shareholder scrutiny. Another potential reason for this important result could be
that savings banks and small commercial banks typically operate in highly localized and
non-competitive banking markets, while the relevant banking market of a large commercial
bank is typically larger and more competitive so that their managers face more pressure to
cut costs. The level of X-eﬃciency diﬀers from country to country in Europe. Among the
ﬁve big EU countries only German banks have been successful in attaining relatively high
X-eﬃciency levels in 1993-1997; the UK and France have hovered around the EU average;
a n dI t a l ya n dS p a i nh a v eb e e nb a dp e r f o r m e r si nt e r m so fX - e ﬃciency. Most EU mem-
ber states have not witnessed any improvement in the X-eﬃciency level of their banking
sectors, however, the three Nordic EU countries have been a positive exception to this rule.
Finally, eﬃcient banks and ineﬃcient bank diﬀer. First and foremost, eﬃcient savings
banks generate about 20 percent more proﬁts than ineﬃcient savings banks. Eﬃcient
savings banks also attract more capital in the form of deposits and they generate more
income in the form of commissions than ineﬃcient savings banks. Eﬃcient commercial
banks incur only two-thirds of the costs of ineﬃcient commercial banks, however they
are not more proﬁtable than their ineﬃcient counterparts. Eﬃcient commercial banks are
m o r eo f t e ni n v o l v e di no ﬀ-balance-sheet activities and commission-generating business than
ineﬃcient commercial banks. They also hold more securities. Taken together, these results
could suggest that eﬃcient commercial banks rely on a more diverse portfolio of outputs,
among which investment banking activities. It may also be that the set of commercial
report a possible cost reducing eﬀect from choosing a bigger size to be between 7-10 percent. However, this
ﬁgure represents an unweighted average of all banks, while we have weighted banks by their balance-sheet
total.
3banks is too diverse to compare them using a single frontier. In particular, commercial
banks that are deemed eﬃcient may often be investment banks in disguise.
This paper adds to the small but growing strand of literature that assesses the eﬃciency
of the EU banking sector. Other works include Altunbas et al. (2001), Casu and Molyneux
(2000), Carbo et al. (2001), Carbo et al. (2002), Maudos, Pastor, Pérez, and Quesada
(2002), and Vander Vennet (2002).6 Comprehensive EU datasets only became available
relatively recently. Another major impediment for the emergence of more evidence on bank
eﬃciency in Europe has been the fact that banking sectors within the EU diﬀer. Altunbas
and Chakravarty (1998) demonstrate this by showing that various EU member states host
b a n k i n gs e c t o r so fad i ﬀerent composition than others, and that diﬀerent bank types oﬀer
services of a diﬀerent nature and diﬀer in terms of average eﬃciency. Thus, the approach
in this study is to allow for a comparison between banks within the EU by treating bank
types diﬀerently.7
Another contribution of this paper is that it is the ﬁrst application of the new Recursive
Thick Frontier Approach (RTFA) of Wagenvoort, O’Brien, and Schure (2001). RTFA is an
econometric frontier approach to assessing technical eﬃciency that relies on an iterative
procedure. Wagenvoort et al. (2001) show that RTFA is superior to the Stochastic Frontier
Approach (SFA) for realistic features of the data. SFA is the approach taken in all the
studies mentioned above. This paper hence provides an important robustness check for the
evidence produces by the recent EU banking studies mentioned above.
The paper is organised as follows. The next section explains the methodology used in
this study. We devote ample attention to explaining RTFA because it is a new approach.
Section 3 describes the data, Section 4 discusses the results, and Section 5 concludes.
6Country studies in Europe have been available longer. Altunbas et al. (2001)d e v o t eas e c t i o no ft h e i r
paper to a survey.
7This approach is also explored by Vander Vennet (2002).
42T h e m e t h o d o l o g y
2.1 The cost model and the estimation method
The study proceeds in two steps. In the ﬁrst step we establish the so-called cost frontier
and use it to assess the eﬃciency of the individual banks. The cost frontier represents the
relationship between costs, output levels and input prices of the relatively eﬃcient banks
–the so-called best-practice banks– in the dataset.8 We choose a parametric frontier
speciﬁcation and use the new Recursive Thick Frontier Approach (RTFA) of Wagenvoort
et al. (2001) to estimate it. In the second step of our study we investigate to what extent
eﬃcient banks diﬀer from ineﬃcient ones.
Regarding the deﬁnition of the output variables in our study, we adopt the so-called
value-added approach and view banking ﬁrms as producers of services such as screening
projects, monitoring borrowers, enforcing contracts, portfolio selection, hedging risks, pro-
viding payment services, providing brokerage services, keeping deposits and other claims
liquid, providing repayment insurance, etc. We assume the actual quantity of services pro-
duced by a bank can be proxied by relevant variables on the bank’s balance sheet and the
bank’s proﬁt and loss account. For example, deposits are an output, because deposits are
a proxy for the bank’s payment services among other things. We also deﬁned loans to be
an output because loans necessitate screening and monitoring activities.
Like the well-known Stochastic Frontier Approach (SFA) popularized by Aigner, Lovell
and Schmidt (1977) and Meeusen and Van den Broeck (1977), we assume that deviations
from the frontier can be caused by random error as well as X-ineﬃciency. Random error
is included to represent measurement errors in the input or output variables, or factors
which are beyond the control of the ﬁrm’s management (‘good luck’ or ‘bad luck’). In this
8The cost frontier is identical to the cost function in case these best-practice banks are actually tech-
nologically eﬃcient.
5study we estimate a (transformed) Cobb-Douglas cost frontier that has been augmented





























4 +εti,i ∈ E(1)
In equation 1, E represents the set of best-practice banks in the dataset. TC ti and TA ti
represent total costs and total assets (balance sheet total) of bank i in period t.9 The
equation incorporates six outputs and three inputs. Bank i’s amount of output of type k
in year t is denoted by yti,k, k =1 ,...,6, and the price of input j in year t by ptj, j =1 ,2,3.
In this study we have included ﬁve size dummies, s1,ti,...s5,ti to account for six size classes
the banks can fall in, as well as four time dummies t1,...,t4 as the dataset comprises T =5
years. Finally, εti is a random symmetrically distributed disturbance term.
Regarding the subset of ineﬃcient banks in the dataset —i.e. the set of banks that are
not on the cost frontier represented by equation 1— no speciﬁcs t r u c t u r eis assumed. RTFA
allows each individual ineﬃcient bank to adopt any available technology and be ineﬃcient
to any possible degree (Wagenvoort et al., 2001). This freedom is a great advantage of
RTFA when compared to SFA or similar methods.
We have estimated equation 1 in logs and under the standard restriction that the sum
of the input price elasticities equals 1 (α1 +α2 +α3 =1 ). Before estimating we detrended
our input prices by regressing them on the time dummies. These three auxiliary regressions
make sure that the interpretation of the coeﬃcients of the time dummies correctly reﬂect
the impact of structural changes. Schure and Wagenvoort (1999) discuss the novel auxiliary
regressions in detail. They also show how to derive structural-form parameter estimates
and their variances from the estimated reduced-form model. Time coeﬃcients of many
existing studies on panel data are biased because input prices reveal a clear time pattern
as well.
9One of our six outputs, namely commission revenue, is scaled by the bank’s total operating income,
rather than total assets.
6RTFA of Wagenvoort et al. (2001) is a relatively straightforward method based on
recursive OLS estimation of subsets of the dataset. Because RTFA is a new approach
to estimating technical eﬃciency, let us sketch the algorithm in the context of this study.
Below, let j indicate the number of the iteration and let nj be the number of banks that are
left over in the sample during iteration j. In this application of RTFA let Iij be an indicator
function that takes on the value Iij =1if four or ﬁve out of the ﬁve OLS residuals for
bank i in iteration j have the same sign. Deﬁne Zj =
Pnj
i=1 Iij.
The RTFA algorithm of Wagenvoort et al. (2001)
Step 1 (Initialization) Set j =0and n0 = N, where N represents the number of banks in
the dataset. Choose δ, i.e. the speed of the data reduction process. In this study we
have set δ =0 .01 which means that nj is reduced by 1 p e r c e n ti ne a c hi t e r a t i o n .
Step 2 (Estimation) Compute the OLS estimates for (1 − jδ) ∗ 100 percent of the data
Step 3 (Binomial test) Compute the test statistic λj =
(Zj−0.375nj)2
nj0.375(1−0.375) and compare it
with χ2
0.99(1), the 99th percentile of the chi-squared distribution with one degree of
freedom. If λj < χ2
0.99(1) then stop the iterations and report the last OLS regression
results as the output of the algorithm. Otherwise go to step 4.
Step 4 (Preparing for next iteration) Compute the mean mij of the ﬁve regression resid-
uals of each bank i, including banks which were omitted in previous iterations. Set
j := j+1. Select the nj =( 1−δj)N banks that enter the next iteration by discarding
the δjN banks with the largest values of mij,i=1 ,...,N.G ot oS t e p2 .
Step 3 of the algorithm needs explanation. First, notice that in general Zj will be
large in case the subsample still contains both eﬃcient and ineﬃcient banks (in this case
relatively eﬃcient banks tend to have 4 or 5 negative residuals, while ineﬃcient banks tend
7to have 4 or 5 positive residuals). By contrast, in case only best practice banks are in the
subsample, the ﬁve residuals of each bank tend to be scattered evenly around the frontier
and there is a 50 percent chance a single residual falls on either side of the regression line.
In this case theoretically there is a probability of (0.5)5+4(0.5)5+(0.5)5 +4(0.5)5 =0 .375
that each individual bank has either 4 or 5 positive residuals, or 4 or 5 negative residuals.
Furthermore, these probabilities are independent, so that the number of banks with 4
or 5 residuals of the same sign follows a binomial distribution with success probability
0.375. It is a standard result that the binomial distribution approaches the normal, so λj
is asymptotically χ2(1)—distributed.
X-eﬃciency measures the degree to which banks acquire and use their inputs in a
eﬃcient way. In this study we report ineﬃciency measures for each bank, rather than an
eﬃciency measure. We measure the degree of X-ineﬃciency of a bank by its distance from
the cost frontier. Deﬁne d TCti
TAti to be the costs over assets of bank i in year t if it were on




























The degree of X-ineﬃciency of bank i in year t (T-ineﬀti) represents the mean percentage
cost reduction the bank could have achieved without sacriﬁcing any output:
X-ineﬀti =
TC ti





Size eﬃciency measures the degree to which banks can reduce costs per asset by choos-
ing the right scale of their operations. Deﬁne σmin to be the value of the size dummy
of banks in the size class with minimum costs, i.e. σmin =m i n {1, b σ1,..., b σ5}.T h e size-

















5 − σmin is statistically signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. We have
taken S-ineﬀti =0in case this was not the case.
8In equation 1 the size dummies capture (dis)economies of scale, while the time dummies
pick up structural developments in time, such as technological progress or the impact
of deregulation.11 We have introduced the dummies such that the dummy parameters
(σ1,...,σ5,δ1,...,δ4) all become one under the null hypothesis of no economies of scale
and no structural changes such as technological progress. By contrast, if banks in size
class j, say, have signiﬁcantly lower (higher) costs than the banks in the reference class,
the parameter estimate of the respective size dummy will be signiﬁcantly smaller (larger)
than unity. Likewise, an estimated time dummy that is signiﬁcantly smaller (larger) than
unity indicates that in that year costs have generally been lower (higher) than costs in the
reference year 1993, for example due to technological progress.
In the second step of our study we exploit the fact that RTFA divides up the sample into
an eﬃcient subset of banks (i.e. subset E a b o v e )a n da ni n e ﬃcient subset. We compute
means of speciﬁc variables of interest in both subsets and test H0: the means are identical
versus H1:t h em e a n sd i ﬀer. The test is performed with a standard pooled two sample
t-test. This procedure is a relatively robust way to test for diﬀerences. It is worthwhile to
stress, though, that RTFA also allows for analyses of the type introduced in Berger and
Mester (1997).
2.2 Discussion
Bank outputs. By viewing services production as the business of banks we adopt what
Berger and Humphrey (1992) call the Value-Added Approach. Viewing services as the bank’s
business is standard in the modern theoretical banking literature (see e.g. Bhattacharya
and Thakor, 1993). In the value-added approach service production is proxied by relevant
balance-sheet and proﬁt and loss account data. The value-added approach hinges on the
11It remains to be proven whether the time dummies represent structural developments for the generated
parameter estimates. The proofs for this for the present study are delivered in the theory appendix.
9assumption that 1 Euro of output variable k implies the same quantity of service pro-
duction as 1 Euro of output variable k held at another bank. Other methods such as the
Intermediation Approach of Sealey and Lindley (1977) also suﬀe rf r o mt h es a m ed r a w b a c k .
Some studies, notably Berger and Hannan (1989), Hannan and Berger (1991), and
Neumark and Sharpe (1992), have tried to account for output quality diﬀerences by in-
cluding bank proﬁts in conjunction with the Herﬁndahl index (or another proxy for the
bank’s market power) in the regression. According to these studies higher proﬁti n d i c a t e s
better-quality outputs. A market power index is included to control for the fact that higher
concentration proxies more market power, thus also leads to higher proﬁts (Bain, 1951).
Recently, several studies have questioned the assumed link between market concentration
and market power (e.g. Jackson (1992), Jackson (1997), Rhoades (1995), and Hannan
(1997). These studies suggest that the approach only makes sense when correctly identify-
ing the ‘relevant banking market’. In reality the relevant banking market is typically small,
especially for savings banks. Mester (1996) has taken another attempt to account for qual-
ity diﬀerence in bank assets. She has included the average volume of non-performing loans
as a measure for the quality of the loan portfolio. In our study attempts to adopt either of
the solutions above have failed due to data restrictions. First, no data were available that
link banks to their respective banking market. In this case, including proﬁtability leads to
an endogeneity problem because cost eﬃciency and proﬁtability are linked in principle.12
Also, BankScope does not include data on nonperforming loans.13
Bank inputs. The choice of our inputs conforms to standard practice in the literature.
However, we shall see below that our input prices are not based on the actual expenses
incurred by each bank, but represent (proxies for) the market prices the banks face. While
12Our savings banks results presented later show that cost eﬃcient savings banks are more proﬁtable
than cost ineﬃcient savings banks.
13However, a feasible idea used by e.g. Altunbas et al. (2001) would have been to include the amount
of equity as an (imperfect) proxy of the bank’s risk.
10most studies deﬁne prices based on actual expenses, Mountain and Thomas (1999) and
Berger and Mester (2001) argue that market prices should be used when available.
Cost model. Notice that our cost model is general. Diﬀerent banking products can
attribute diﬀerently to the costs of an eﬃcient bank. In addition, the dummies allow the
cost frontier to change over time and can change with the scale of the bank’s operations.
Possible changes over time would reﬂect structural changes, such as technological progress
or the impact of changes in bank regulation. By allowing the frontier diﬀer with the scale
of a bank we allow for possible (dis)economies of scale.
The theory appendix shows that in our study the size dummies correctly reveal economies
to scale. Introductory microeconomic textbooks show that the long-run cost curve must
‘envelope’ all short-run cost curves. The theory appendix to this paper derives how we can
test whether our frontier has the enveloping property and also presents the test results.
In this study there is very convincing evidence that the estimated frontier may indeed
represent a long-run cost curve.
In equation 1 we have scaled total costs and the output variables by total assets. Scaling
is necessary because our output variables are in nominal (Euro) terms, while a cost function
requires outputs to be in real units. Thus, without scaling, our nominal output, proxies
would not be comparable between diﬀerent years in an environment with inﬂation. There
is also an important econometric reason to scale. The amount wasted by ineﬃciency is
typically thought of to be a percentage of the assets held by a particular ineﬃcient bank.
If so, and variables are not scaled, the disturbances are not orthogonal to the regressors
in the cost model, so that the model parameters are not estimated consistently, unless we
resort to instrumental variable estimation.14
14In case RTFA would be applied without scaling this would be problematic in all but the last iteration.
We recommend scaling (or another solution to the problem outlined here) for other eﬃciency studies
adopting an econometric frontier methodology as well.
11We have also transformed our output variables by adding 1 to every scaled output.
Transforming outputs is one solution to the problem encountered in many eﬃciency studies
that some outputs values are zero or very small. Taking logs would then be infeasible or
produce extremely large negative values.15 Our variable transformation results in a shift
to an interval where the log function curves less steeply. While this solution resolves the
problem sketched above it should be noted that the estimated coeﬃcients of the output
variables can no longer be interpreted as elasticities.
The Cobb-Douglas speciﬁcation implies a stronger restriction on the set of technologies
than can be borne out by the data with respect to the other two speciﬁcations, and is per-
haps therefore not used in other recent bank eﬃciency studies.16 Most eﬃciency studies
choose the translog cost frontier speciﬁcation (that is, a second-order Taylor approximation
in logs of a general cost function)17 or the fourier ﬂexible form (FF) speciﬁcation that is said
to provide a better global approximation of the cost function.18 We have tried the translog
cost function speciﬁcation in our study as well, but it led to a slightly lower adjusted R2
value. In addition, regression results of the translog speciﬁcation are far more diﬃcult to
interpret because the speciﬁcation implies a serious degree of multicollinearity.19 Multi-
collinearity and interpretability is an even more severe problem for the FF speciﬁcation
since by construction it contains more variables than the translog speciﬁcation. Altunbas
15Lang and Welzel (1996) and Al-Obaidan (1999) make explicit mention of this problem.
16However, the Cobb-Douglas speciﬁcation has been applied in ‘older’ studies including Cooper (1980)
and Fanjul and Maravall (1985)
17Examples include Berger (1995), Berger and Hannan (1998), Goldberg and Ray (1996), Lang and
Welzel (1996), Hughes and Mester (1998), Maudos (1998), Mester (1996), Rogers (1998), and Vander
Vennet (1996).
18Examples are McAllister and McManus (1993), DeYoung and Hasan (1998), and Altunbas et al.
(2001).
19As an example, using the translog cost function we obtained one signiﬁcantly negative price coeﬃcient
and two which exceeded one. Another reason to favour the augmented Cobb-Douglas speciﬁcation in this
study was that during the sample period input prices happened to change gradually. It is therefore nontriv-
ial to distinguish the eﬀect of price developments on costs from time-related eﬀects such as technological
progress. We found an appealing solution for this problem, but one which is not suitable for the translog
or the ﬂexible fourier transform speciﬁc a t i o n s( s e eS c h u r ea n dW a g e n v o o r t ,1999).
12and Chakravarty (2001) present an even more severe objection to using the FF speciﬁcation
in a recent article. They demonstrate that the FF speciﬁcation leads to bad predictions
of the cost base of banks not represented in the dataset when compared to the translog
speciﬁcation.
The Estimation Method (RTFA). RTFA is an econometric frontier approach that
is used on panel data. A major advantage of RTFA when compared to econometric ap-
proaches that can be applied to cross-section data, such as SFA of Aigner, Lovell and
Schmidt (1977) and Meeusen and Van den Broeck (1977), the GMM method of Kopp and
Mullahy (1990), and the Thick Frontier Approach (TFA) of Berger and Humphrey (1992),
is that no speciﬁc distributional assumptions are made regarding the ineﬃciency term.20
The only assumption that is made is that there exists a subgroup with a critical number
of ﬁrms that are on the frontier in each time period (Wagenvoort et al., 2001).
RTFA also has advantages over econometric panel data methods such as Distribution
Free Approach (DFA) of Berger (1993) and the Stochastic Varying Coeﬃcients Frontier
Approach (SVFA) of Kalirajan and Obwona (1994). DFA, i.e. the within estimator in a
panel data model with ﬁxed eﬀects, assumes that the ineﬃciency of an individual ﬁrm stays
constant over time. This assumption is problematic in an environment in which some ﬁrms
become more or less eﬃcient. A drawback of SVFA is that the data panel must cover a
relatively large number of time-periods and/or relatively many restrictions on the response
coeﬃcients have to be made.
Wagenvoort et al. (2001) assess the properties of RTFA by means of a simulation study.
They conclude that RTFA performs well in several simulation experiments which “describe
production data more realistically than the SFA model”. They show that SFA turns out
to be highly sensitive to dynamics in production behaviour. If some ﬁrms become more or
20Note, however, that Kopp and Mullahy (1990)’s assumptions are testable, and less restrictive than for
instance the SFA assumptions.
13Table 1: The savings and commercial banks in our dataset. (Source: Bankscope)
Country Savings assets 1997 Commercial assets 1997 Total
banks (in billions ECU) banks (in billion ECU) # banks
Austria 22 88.11 6 150.8 38
Belgium 17 181.6 37 492.0 54
Denmark 27 6.2 44 74.4 71
Finland 11 .9 5 90.1 6
France 82 1099.6 237 2019.8 319
Germany 968 1393.3 178 2850.7 1146
Greece 00 148 1.6 14
Ireland 00 5109.7 5
Italy 161 422.2 64 1256.8 225
Luxembourg 32 6 . 1 88 310.2 91
Netherlands 11 93.6 27 641.9 28
Portugal 2 45.9 18 174.9 20
Spain 60 337.8 75 967.7 135
Sweden 00 42 3 1.2 4
United Kingdom 33 6 . 6 6 11 737.1 64
EU-15 1347 3832.9 873 11188.9 2220
less eﬃcient over time then SFA turns out to considerably biased in the estimation of pro-
ductive eﬃciency of best practice ﬁrms. By contrast, RTFA ﬁnds the relevant production
parameters as well as the set of eﬃcient banks in a robust way.
3 The data
We have constructed our bank datasets from the ‘BankScope’ dataset of Bureau van Dijk.
BankScope contains bank data from annual reports and rating agencies. To construct our
p r i c ed a t aw eh a v ed r a w nf r o mt h e1998 edition of ‘Bank Proﬁtability’ of the OECD, the
International Financial Statistics of the IMF, Datastream International, and the CRONOS
data set of Eurostat.
We use annual balance-sheet and proﬁt-and-loss data for BankScope’s ‘savings banks’
and ‘commercial banks’ for the period 1993-1997. Notice that the start of the sample period
coincides with the year the EU’s Second Banking Directive (1989) came into force. The
14Table 2: Desciptive statistics of the variables of the cost model: savings and commercial
banks in 1997 (EU minus Luxembourg) (all scaled outputs in percentages).
Mean Median St. Dev. Min Max
Savings banks:
Total costs/total assets 6.62 6.44 1.03 3.79 15.41
Total deposists/total assets 83.61 87.36 11.49 7.45 97.65
Total loans/total assets 58.25 61.15 13.63 0.85 95.78
Equity investments/total assets 1.30 0.67 1.97 0.00 23.27
Oﬀ-balance sheet items/total assets 10.84 7.94 11.68 0.00 193.58
Commission revenues/total income 6.29 7.194 . 0 3 0 . 0 0 3 8 . 12
Commercial banks:
Total costs/total assets 8.04 7.174 . 6 2 3 . 0 3 7 9 . 12
Total deposists/total assets 74.76 81.02 18.32 0.71 97.31
Total loans/total assets 48.47 49.97 23.75 0.00 98.34
Equity investments/total assets 1.91 0.52 5.160 . 0 0 8 2 . 0 8
Oﬀ-balance sheet items/total assets 25.24 15.61 32.44 0.00 256.04
Commission revenues/total income 8.93 3.911 3.53 0.00 98.98
Price data:
Price of funds (percentages) 1.93 1.311 .30 0.46 5.12
P r i c eo fl a b o u r( t h o u s a n d so fE C U ) 50 54 11 33 65
Price of buildings (Germany 1995 = 100) 94 94 156 7 127
data appendix gives a detailed summary of the selection criteria we applied when retrieving
our bank samples from BankScope, as well as several measures we adopted to clean the
data. Table 1 displays the banks in our datasets, and breaks them up according to their
home country. The set of savings banks comprises 1347 banks, notably from Germany,
Italy, France and Spain. There are 873 commercial banks and each EU member hosts at
least a few of them.
We deﬁne the explanatory variable total costs of each bank as the sum of the BankScope
variables ‘interest expense’, ‘total operating expense’ and ‘commission expense’. We iden-
tify six output variables: Total Deposits, Total Loans, Equity Investments, Oﬀ-balance-
sheet Items, Commission Revenue, and Total Securities.21 Total Deposits comprise de-
21While six outputs is more than the number most other eﬃciency studies use, we would have loved to
break up deposits into ﬁner parts, e.g. customer deposits and interbank deposits. Unfortunately, the data
for German banks does not allow this.
15mand, savings and time deposits. Total Loans corresponds to BankScope variables ‘total
loans’ plus ‘total other lending’. Equity investments are obtained by adding up ‘equity
investments’ and ‘other investments’. Equity Investments includes participations in com-
panies with related business, and shares in non-ﬁnancial aﬃl i a t e s( n o ts h a r e sh e l da sp a r t
of the security portfolio). Thus, Equity Investments may imply costly activities such as
screening and actively monitoring ﬁrms. Oﬀ-balance-sheet Items is as deﬁn e di nB a n k S c o p e
and contains contingent liabilities arising from guarantees, irrevocable letters of credit, ir-
revocable facilities, discounted bills, etc. (derivatives are not included). Just like loans,
Oﬀ-balance-sheet Items force the bank to screen and monitor projects. Commission Rev-
enue is also as deﬁned in BankScope. Contrary to the other output variables, Commission
Revenue is a ﬂow variable that is taken from the bank’s proﬁt-and-loss account. Finally,
Total Securities is obtained by subtracting ‘deposits with banks’ and ‘investments’ from
‘total other earning assets’. Table 2 contains some relevant descriptive statistics regarding
the output variables.
We deﬁne three input prices, namely the price of funds,t h eprice of labour and the
price of buildings.T h e price of funds is obtained by taking a weighted average of the
real deposit rate and the real 3-month interbank rate.22 The price of labour represents
the average wage rate in the banking sector in each country, and the price of buildings is
created by taking an appropriate price index for newly delivered buildings and correcting it
for the relative price levels in each country. The data appendix contains three tables with
the price data, as well as a detailed description of how the tables were generated. Table 2
contains some descriptive statistics on the price data.
Let us have a quick look at the cost side of the data. Figure 1 and Figure 2 show the
decomposition of total costs in 1993 and 1997 of the banking sectors of each EU member
22The weights diﬀer for each bank. In particular, the weight of the real deposit rate equals the bank’s
deposit funding over the bank’s total funding (total assets).
16Figure 1: Decomposition of total costs of banking in the EU-15i n1993. Individual banks


































































































































Figure 2: Decomposition of total costs of banking in the EU-15i n1997. Individual banks

































































































































17state and the corresponding EU-15 averages. The tables reveal that costs per unit of
assets diﬀer considerably within the EU. There are also diﬀerences in the composition of
costs between banks of diﬀerent EU member states. Looking at changes over time, we see
that, on average, the ratio of total cost over total assets dropped from almost 9 percent
in 1993 to less than 7 percent in 1997. Possible candidates for the reason why costs have
gone down are: (1) a less costly output mix, (2) structural changes, such as, for example,
technological progress, or (3) cheaper inputs. O’Brien and Wagenvoort (2000) show that
input price reductions, particularly an interest rate reduction, can only partially explain
the cost reduction that took place over time. This indicates our study will likely ﬁnd cost
reductions resulting from a shift to lower-value-added outputs, or because of structural
factors
4T h e R e s u l t s
4.1 Savings banks
RTFA yields that 317o ft h et o t a l1344 savings banks in the starting sample are on the
estimated frontier. With an adjusted R2 of 69 percent our model explains the variation in
total costs over total assets of eﬃcient banks very satisfactorily.
Before discussing the results let us ﬁrst have a more careful look at whether RTFA has
been applied in a reliable way. Table 3 gives a breakdown by country of the savings banks
in the initial sample and on the frontier. With 968 banks in the initial sample and 286
on the frontier, German savings banks clearly dominate estimation. However, we have no
indication that German domination is harmful because some other countries have similar
percentages of their banks on the frontier as Germany. France has 17 banks on the frontier
(20.7 percent of the 82 French banks in the starting sample), Austria 8 (36.4 percent),
18Table 3: Savings banks. Breakdown of the number of banks, and the number of eﬃcient
banks by country.
Country Number of banks used Eﬃcient set of Percentage selected
for frontier estimation banks
Austria 22 8 36.4
Belgium 17 4 23.5
Denmark 27 1 3.7
Finland 1 00
France 82 17 20.7






Spain 60 0 0
Sweden 00 —
United Kingdom 3 1 33.3
EU-15 1344 317 23.6
and Belgium 4 (23.5 percent). Italy and Spain host relatively many savings banks, but do
not have a single eﬃcient one, while Denmark has merely one eﬃcient savings bank. The
remaining countries hardly host savings banks.
Table 4 breaks down the savings banks on the frontier by size. Again, while in principle
small banks could have dominated the regression there is no evidence of any harm done.
To the contrary, savings banks that control more than 10 billion ECU in assets are more
often found to be X-eﬃcient. Observe that only six observations fall in the largest size
class. Although the size dummy associated with the largest size class is not signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent from one, six observations are too few to judge that the biggest size class can be
combined with the reference class.23
Figure 3 presents histograms of the estimated X-eﬃciencies of the eﬃcient as well as
ineﬃcient observations. The ﬁgure is based on 1344 banks × 5 years = 6720 observations.
23In fact, we introduced the size dummy for the biggest size class in the savings banks regression merely
for reasons of symmetry with the commercial banks regression.
19Table 4: Savings banks. Breakdown of the observations in the starting sample, and on the
frontier by size. (# observations = 1344 savings banks × 5 years = 6720)
Size class (in billions of ECU) Observations used for Eﬃcient set of Percentage selected
frontier estimation observations
Total Assets ≤ 2.5 5677 1343 23.6
2.5<Total Assets ≤ 5 603 130 21.6
5<Total Assets ≤ 7.5 158 41 25.9
7.5<Total Assets ≤ 10 77 15 19.5
10<Total Assets ≤ 100 184 50 27.2
Total Assets>100 21 6 28.6
T o t a ln u m b e ro fo b s e r v a t i o n s 6720 1585 23.6
T o t a ln u m b e ro fs a v i n g sb a n k s 1344 317 23.6
Recall that RTFA ensures that eﬃcient banks cannot structurally lie above or under the
frontier. Also, recall that ineﬃcient banks may have years in which they perform very
well so that observations of ineﬃcient banks may achieve a high eﬃciency score in a given
year. Importantly, the ﬁgure shows that X-eﬃciencies of eﬃcient observations appear
approximately symmetrically distributed. This suggests that eﬃcient European savings
banks constitute a relatively homogenous group. The histogram of the X-eﬃciencies of
the ineﬃcient observations seems to be bimodal. Bimodality in the data would suggest
that typical econometric frontier methods such as SFA should not be used, theoretically
speaking. By contrast, RTFA should have worked well since RTFA does not really make
assumptions on the distribution of ineﬃcient observations.
We have investigated whether the X-eﬃciencies of ineﬃcient banks develop over time
but did not discover any trend. We have also computed that the mean X-eﬃciency of
eﬃcient banks is equal to 1.008 with a standard deviation of 0.065. Thus, under normality,
a 95% conﬁdence interval for the X-eﬃciencies of eﬃcient banks is (0.880,1.135). By
contrast, ineﬃcient banks turn out to have a mean X-eﬃciency of 0.833 and a standard
deviation of 0.148. Here the normality assumption would imply a 95% conﬁdence interval
of (0.542,1.124). Again, however, the normality assumption in case of the ineﬃcient banks


























seems inappropriate, and, evidently, the conﬁdence interval will have an overestimated
lower bound and an underestimated upper bound. Finally, we have established from the
X-eﬃciency data that the mean value of the X-eﬃciencies of eﬃcient banks and ineﬃcient
banks are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent at the 95 percent conﬁdence level.
Table 5 presents the weighted averages of the X-ineﬃciencies per year for countries that
have more than 10 savings banks in our dataset. To compute the percentages both eﬃcient
and ineﬃcient banks were included, and each bank was weighted by its balance-sheet total.
Weighting banks has the advantage of creating an overall impression of the savings bank
sector in a given country, but it may also lead to jumps in eﬃciency levels in some years
because a big bank may experience a good year or a bad year. The evidence suggests that
the EU savings banking sector can cut costs by about 15-20 percent at the current level of
production. The new EU banking laws that came into force in 1993 seem not to have had
any positive impact in terms of reducing X-ineﬃciency of savings banks. Savings banks in
21Table 5: Savings banks. Weighted average of X-ineﬃciencies per country per year. (Banks
are weighted by their total assets)
Country 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Austria 11 9 153 6
Belgium 8221 -1
Denmark 37 192 816 11
France 18 142 4152 1
Germany 66445
Italy 34 32 49 43 35
Spain 44 41 46 46 44
EU-15 18 152 017 18
Table 6: Weighted average X-ineﬃciencies of small and large savings banks. Small bank:
bank has total assets amount of less than 10 billions of ECU in one or more years (large
bank: more).
Country 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Small (n=48) 16 15 19 18 15
Large (n=1312) 211 72 11 6 19
Belgium and Germany, and to a lesser extent, Austria, are performing consistently well in
terms of managerial eﬃciency. The savings bank sectors in Spain and Italy appear to be
lagging well behind their European counterparts with X-ineﬃciency levels that well exceed
30 percent. The savings bank sector in Denmark and France are moderately ineﬃcient in
the sample period, however Denmark shows clear improvement over time.
Table 6 contrasts the ineﬃciency level of small and large savings banks. The evidence
tentatively suggests that large savings banks are slightly more X-ineﬃcient than small
savings banks. This could for instance suggest it is a bit easier to manage a small savings
institution.
Now let us take a closer look at the cost structure of the eﬃcient European savings
banks. Table 7 reports the relevant RTFA regression results. The table shows that scaled
costs are positively related to the amount of deposits taken, the amount of loans granted,
strategic equity positions (equity investments), and commission revenue (all scaled). These




Total Deposits/TA 0.55593 11.24∗
Total Loans/TA 0.65342 28.17∗
Equity Investments/TA 0.36644 7.02∗
Oﬀ-balance-sheet Items/TA -0.05443 -2.75∗
Commission Revenue/TOI 1.48085 28.40∗
Total Securities/TA 0.00991 0.43
Price of funds 0.00490 1.02
Price of labour 0.94291 27.56∗
Price of buildings 0.05219 1.60
Dummy TA=2.5 1.04775 4.54∗
Dummy 2.5<TA=5 1.05181 4.95∗
Dummy 5<TA=7.5 1.062164 . 9 5 ∗
Dummy 10<TA=100 1.04152 2.46∗
Dummy TA>100 1.02237 0.96
Dummy 1997 0.68143 -5.72∗
Dummy 1996 0.73083 -4.50∗
Dummy 1995 0.79297 -3.18∗
Dummy 1994 0.91132 -1.19
Adjusted R2 0.69
# banks on the cost frontier 317
# banks under the frontier with zero weight 45
∗ Signiﬁcant at the 95% conﬁdence level.
results exactly match our priors as these balance-sheet items are proxies for costly activities
such as, for example, deposit services, originating and enforcing loans contracts, monitoring
ﬁrms, and oﬀering a variety of other services to ﬁrms. There is no clear relationship between
costs and the bank’s position in marketable securities. Again, this is not a surprising result
because securities do not involve neither high transactions costs, nor great eﬀort to acquire
the necessary information. The only result that perhaps appears strange is the negative
sign of the variable Oﬀ-balance-sheet Items. We conjecture that this result relates to the
fact that the source of Oﬀ-balance-sheet Items involves several fee-based activities, so that
23the positive eﬀect on costs has already been picked up by the variable Commission Revenue.
Regarding the inﬂuence of the input prices, the most remarkable result is the very low
coeﬃcient of the price of funds (about 0.005). O’Brien and Wagenvoort (2000) discuss
this eyebrow-raising result at length. They ﬁnd, ﬁrst, that the relationship between the
input prices and costs is unstable for diﬀerent model speciﬁc a t i o n s( s e ea l s oS c h u r ea n d
Wagenvoort, 1999). This suggests that there are high correlations between the input prices.
For the price of buildings and the costs of labour a high correlation may not be surprising.
As for the price of funds, the data appendix shows that in the period 1993-1997 most
countries experienced a steadily decreasing price of funds.24 Needless to say, such a steady
decline means high correlation to prices that are subject to steady inﬂationary pressure
such as the price of labour and the price of buildings. O’Brien and Wagenvoort (2000)
also ﬁnd that, while the link between costs and the price of funds seems absent for eﬃcient
banks, there is a clear positive relationship for ineﬃcient banks. This suggests that eﬃcient
banks use less working capital than ineﬃcient banks, or that eﬃcient banks hedge their
interest exposure while ineﬃcient banks do not. Based on the discussion above we place
little value on the reliability of coeﬃcients of the individual prices of funds.
The size dummies of our cost model reveal possible long-term economies of scale.25 The
evidence shows that economies of scale are exhausted for savings banks with total assets of
more than 10 billion ECU. The evidence even tentatively suggests that a European savings
bank has an optimum size between 7.5 and 10 billion ECU in assets. Assuming constant
returns-to-scale for banks with more than 10 billion ECU in assets, we have computed that
the EU savings bank sector can reduce costs by around 3 percent when small savings banks
24For 12 countries in our sample this was most likely aﬀected by convergence related to the introduction
of the single currency in January 1999.
25In the theory appendix the short-run economies of scale are derived for the purpose of verifying
whether the RTFA parameter estimates actually constitute a well-deﬁned cost function. In accordance
with neoclassical theory, we ﬁnd evidence of short-run decreasing returns to scale for banks in each size
class.
24Table 8: Comparing eﬃcient and ineﬃcient savings banks: The mean return on equity, the
mean (scaled) cost level, and the mean (scaled) output levels. (standard deviations given
in brackets) (TA = Total Assets, TOI = Total Operating Income.)
Eﬃcient banks Ineﬃcient banks t-valuea
Mean Return on Equity 8.05 (2.81) 6.56 (3.29) 29.02∗
Total Costs/TA 0.0644 (0.0076) 0.0770 (0.0140) -34.1∗
Total Deposits/TA 0.8809 (0.0573) 0.8289 (0.1206) 16.6∗
Total Loans /TA 0.5867 (0.1438) 0.5647 (0.1388) 5.5∗
Equity Investments/TA 0.0143 (0.0321)0 . 0 137 (0.0246) 0.8
Oﬀ-balance Sheet/TA 0.0856 (0.1156) 0.0957 (0.0889) -3.7∗
Commission Revenue /TOI 0.0737 (0.0350) 0.0565 (0.0390) 15.8∗
Total Securities/TA 0.2170 (0.0963) 0.2363 (0.1142) -6.1∗
at-statistic for pooled two sample t-test.
∗Signiﬁcantly diﬀerent at the 95% conﬁdence level.
consolidate to take on the optimum size.26
The ﬁnal piece of evidence in Table 7 regards the impact of structural changes over the
time period. The time dummies reveal strong and signiﬁcant shifts in the cost frontier.
Managerially eﬃcient savings banks were able to reduce cost over assets by on average
6.4 percent per year, after taking into account input price changes and variations in the
output mix. O’Brien and Wagenvoort (2000) analyse this ﬁnding carefully and ﬁnd that
the percentage should be seen as an upper bound for the eﬀect of structural changes.
While they also attain signiﬁcant positive (cost reducing) eﬀects using diﬀerent model
speciﬁcations they tentatively suggest the order of magnitude of the cost reduction from
structural changes for eﬃcient savings banks is closer to 4.5 percent annually. The forces
at work explaining the ﬁnding could be the impact of increased competition following the
implementation of the Second Banking Directive in 1993, technological progress, or both.
An interesting question left open in many studies on bank eﬃciency is: In what way
eﬃcient banks are managed diﬀerently from ineﬃcient banks? Are eﬃcient banks involved
26As for the individual member states, Austria can realize 2.92 percent eﬃciency gains from consolidation
of small savings banks, Denmark 4.78 percent, France 1.18 percent, Germany 3.10 percent, Italy 3.16
percent, and Spain 2.58 percent.
25in diﬀerent services? Are they exploiting economies of scope that the frontier leaves un-
veiled? Our ﬁnal pieces of evidence should be seen as a ﬁrst attempt to ﬁnd the answers
to these questions. In Table 8 we ﬁrst investigate whether eﬃcient savings banks are
more proﬁtable than their ineﬃcient counterparts. We observe a signiﬁcant relationship
between proﬁtability and eﬃciency for the European savings bank sector between 1993
and 1997. Eﬃcient savings banks have a mean return on (average) equity is that is about
one-and-a-half percent higher (namely about 8 percent) than the group of ineﬃcient banks
(6.5 percent). The evidence weakly supports the eﬃcient-structure hypothesis,i . e . w e
observe that ”ﬁrms with superior management or production technologies have lower cost
and therefore higher proﬁts” (Berger, 1995). Second, and unsurprisingly, we also ﬁnd that
scaled total costs are lower for eﬃcient savings banks than for ineﬃcient savings banks.
Table 8 also shows that there are signiﬁcant diﬀerences between the output mix for the
eﬃcient and the ineﬃcient savings banks. We ﬁnd that the means of scaled total deposits,
total loans, oﬀ-balance-sheet items, commission revenue and total securities are all signiﬁ-
cantly diﬀerent for eﬃcient and ineﬃcient banks. The most noticeable diﬀerences are that
eﬃcient savings banks oﬀer more deposits than ineﬃcient banks, and derive more operating
income in the form of commissions.
4.2 Commercial banks
The evidence on the European commercial banks presented below suggests that the group
of commercial banks is much more diverse than our sample of savings banks. This is true
despite of our extensive eﬀorts to clean the data. It may be that a one-size-ﬁts-all frontier
for commercial banks is simply not appropriate because perhaps subgroups of commercial
banks are of an entirely diﬀerent nature, and therefore employ diﬀerent technologies. With
this in mind we next present the evidence and our conclusions.
26Table 9: Commercial banks. Breakdown of the number of banks, and the number of
eﬃcient banks by country.
Country Number of banks used Eﬃcient set of Percentage selected
for frontier estimation banks
Austria 16 10 62.5
Belgium 35 17 48.6
Denmark 44 15 34.1
Finland 5 1 20.0
France 229 47 20.5
Germany 172 90 52.3
Greece 140 0
Ireland 5 1 20.0
Italy 63 11 .6
Netherlands 25 11 44.0
Portugal 180 0
Spain 72 0 0
Sweden 40 0
United Kingdom 58 7 12.1
EU-15 846 200 23.6
RTFA yields that 200 commercial banks of the total of 846 in the starting sample are
on the estimated frontier. The adjusted R2-value for the regression is 43 percent. Our cost
model is indeed less well designed to explain the commercial bank sector than the savings
bank sector (adjusted R2-value of 69 percent).
We have attempted to look into ownership data in order to establish what percentage of
the eﬃcient commercial banks are foreign-owned subsidiaries. Unfortunately, in some cases
BankScope does report the identity of the owners or major shareholders of a speciﬁcb a n k .
Some banks have indicated that they wish to keep information on the ownership of the
bank conﬁdential. There are also many instances in which the banks in our database ceased
to exist, mainly because of mergers and takeovers. We found, however, that many eﬃcient
commercial banks have non-European, particularly Japanese, owners. Foreign-owned sub-
sidiaries possibly rely in an important way on the support of their parent organisation. It
may also be that, generally speaking, the nature of ﬁnancial services supplied by foreign-
27Table 10: Commercial banks. Breakdown of the observations in the starting sample, and
on the frontier by size. (# observations = 846 commercial banks × 5 years = 4230)
Size class (in billions of ECU) Observations used for Eﬃcient set of Percentage selected
frontier estimation observations
Total Assets≤2.5 2878 744 25.9
2.5<Total Assets≤5 433 78 18.0
5<Total Assets≤7.5 231 37 16.0
7.5<Total Assets≤10 113 14 12.4
10<Total Assets≤100 452 79 17.5
Total Assets>100 123 48 39.0
T o t a ln u m b e ro fo b s e r v a t i o n s 4230 1000 23.6
T o t a ln u m b e ro fc o m m e r c i a lb a n k s 846 200 23.6
owned subsidiaries in Europe is diﬀerent from the services oﬀered by the home institutions.
If this is indeed the case, the technology of foreign-owned subsidiaries in Europe is simply
diﬀerent from the technology of credit institutions from the home country.
Table 9 presents a summary of the numbers of banks in each country in our starting
s a m p l ea n di nt h es e to fe ﬃcient banks. Incidentally, the percentage of EU-banks on the
frontier is 23.6, the same percentage as observed for savings banks. Observe that relatively
large proportions (proportions greater than 40 percent) of Austrian, Belgian, German and
Dutch banks lie on the cost frontier. In absolute numbers, German and French banks
feature prominently on the frontier. In Table 10 we observe that each size class contains
as u ﬃciently large number of eﬃcient banks for reliable statistical inference. Like in the
savings banks sample, we ﬁnd that the largest credit institutions are most often eﬃciently
run.
The distributions of the X-eﬃciencies for the eﬃcient and ineﬃcient commercial banks
presented in Figure 4 can be shown to have fatter tails than the normal distribution sug-
gests. The X-eﬃciencies for the eﬃcient banks vary excessively with a mean X-eﬃciency
of about 1.04 and a standard deviation of 0.212. A 95% conﬁdence interval for the X-
eﬃciencies is (0.624,1.455) under normality. Given fat tails, the bounds of this interval


















seem to be under-estimated. X-eﬃciencies for the ineﬃcient companies are this time close
to the normal distribution. The ineﬃcient banks have a mean X-eﬃciency of approximately
0.671 and a standard deviation of 0.248. A 95% conﬁdence interval for X-eﬃciencies of in-
eﬃcient banks is (0.185,1.157) if we are willing to assume normality. Note that the bounds
of this interval lie far apart.
Table 11 contains weighted averages of the X-ineﬃciency levels of the commercial banks
in our dataset. Clearly, we cannot derive too many conclusions from these results given the
problems with the sample of commercial banks.27. Nevertheless, it seems safe to conclude
that the average level of X-ineﬃciency of EU commercial banks is about 20-25%. Also,
with ineﬃciencies exceeding 65, 30, 60, and 45 percent, respectively, on average Greek,
27In addition to the problems mentioned above, comparisons of commercial banking sectors across coun-
tries is not straightforward. For example, some countries have many foreign-owned subsidiaries, while
other countries do not. It turns out, for instance, that almost all eﬃcient Italian commercial banks are
I t a l i a no w n e d ,w h e r e a sj u s to v e rah a l fo ft h ee ﬃcient UK commercial banks are British owned.
29Table 11: Commercial banks. Weighted average of X-ineﬃciencies per country per year.
(Banks are weighted by their total assets)
Country 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Austria 8 16910 10
Belgium 9 10 10 106
Denmark 19 11 9- 8 - 19
Finland 35 35 25 24 19
France 182 32 62 32 7
Germany 2 11 588
Greece 72 77 72 71 68
Ireland 37 39 41 42 23
Italy 32 38 49 44 39
Luxembourg 23 182 52 43 0
Netherlands 182 11 8 149
Portugal 67 69 67 64 60
Spain 49 50 55 55 54
Sweden 27 32 29 14 1
United Kingdom 9 152 32 7 9
EU-15 182 42 52 52 2
Table 12: Weighted average X-ineﬃciencies of small and large commercial banks. Small
bank: bank has total assets amount of less than 10 billions of ECU in one or more years
(large bank: more).
Country 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Small (n=131) 29 31 34 33 30
Large (n=846) 182 32 42 42 0
Italian, Portuguese and Spanish commercial banks lag far behind commercial banks in the
rest of the European Union in terms of cost eﬃciency. Notice also that the three Nordic
countries seem have improved over time.
Table 12 splits up the sample into small banks and large banks. We clearly observe
that large commercial banks are on average more eﬃcient than their smaller peers. This
may indicate that large commercial banks compete in larger and more competitive banking
markets than small commercial banks. Another possibility is that large commercial banks
who are more often publicly listed have shareholder that more actively monitor the bank
managers. We also see in the table that neither small nor large commercial banks have
30Table 13: Comparing eﬃcient and ineﬃcient commercial banks: mean return on equity,
mean (scaled) cost level, and mean (scaled) output levels. (standard deviations given in
brackets) (TA = Total Assets, TOI = Total Operating Income.)
Eﬃcient banks Ineﬃcient banks t-valuea
Mean Return on Equity 7.15 (5.54) 7.12 (7.69) 0.26
Total Costs/TA 0.0640 (0.0163) 0.0967 (0.0436) -23.23*
Total Deposits/TA 0.7668 (0.1931)0 . 7 5 9 9( 0 . 1722) 1.07
Total Loans/TA 0.4688 (0.2374) 0.4421 (0.2435) 3.05*
Equity Investments/TA 0.0150 (0.0407) 0.0176 (0.0457) -1.59
Oﬀ-balance Sheet/TA 0.2759 (0.3799) 0.2073 (0.2616) 6.45*
Commission Revenue /TOI 0.0887 (0.0997) 0.0671 (0.1210) 5.12*
Total Securities/TA 0.1951 (0.1843) 0.1579 (0.1577) 6.25*
at-statistic for pooled two sample t-test.
∗Signiﬁcantly diﬀerent at the 95% conﬁdence level.
improved X-eﬃciency over time. This tentatively suggests that the new EU banking laws
that came into eﬀect in January 1993 have not increased competition in EU commercial
banking in the ﬁve years to follow.
We examined the means and standard deviations for the X-eﬃciencies of ineﬃcient
commercial banks in each year. Ineﬃcient commercial banks seem not to catch up with
eﬃcient commercial banks. In fact, the gap between the eﬃcient and ineﬃcient banks
increases slightly with eﬃciency scores of ineﬃcient banks lowering from 0.71 in 1993 to
0.68 in 1997.
Table 14 reports the details on the eﬃcient frontier. Recall that the results should
thus be interpreted with great care and that the 200 best-practice may form a diverse
group of institutions (containing, for instance, foreign-owned commercial banks and EU
based commercial banks; and ‘true’ commercial banks and investment banks in disguise).
Having said this, most results do conﬁrm common wisdom about banks.
There are signiﬁcant positive relationships between (scaled) costs and Total Loans,
Equity Investments, Oﬀ-balance-sheet Items, Commission Revenue and Total Securities
31(all scaled). One diﬀerence with the savings banks results is that there is no signiﬁcant
relationship between (scaled) costs and (scaled) deposits. Another diﬀerence is that Total
Securities is a relevant variable for commercial banks. The last observation could be an
artifact of the regression, but it could also suggest that some commercial banks earn money
by underwriting securities. In this case securities involve investment banking activities and
therefore raise the cost base of the bank. The impact of Commission Revenue on costs
is lower for commercial banks than for savings banks, yet Oﬀ-balance-sheet Items have
more impact. This may indicate again that there is an intimate relationship between these
variables.
Turning to the input prices, again we observe the low coeﬃcient of the price of funds.
The impact of the price of labour is lower in this regression than in the last, while the
impact of the price of buildings is now higher. We reiterate that we place little value on
the reliability of the coeﬃcients of the individual input prices.
We ﬁnd evidence to suggest that there may be increasing returns to scale up to balance-
sheet totals of 5 billion ECU, followed by constant returns to scale up to total assets size
of 100 billion ECU. We ﬁnd that there may be signiﬁcant decreasing returns to scale for
banks larger than 100 billion ECU. In light of the discussion regarding the validity of the
regression results and the diversity of commercial banks, we refrain from predicting what
cost savings could be attained in the EU commercial banking sector.
Finally, the time dummies in Table 14 indicate that commercial banks have attained
cost reductions in 1993-1997 of the same magnitude as the group of savings banks. Again,
this leads us to suggest that increased competitive forces after the introduction of the
Second Banking Directive or the employment of new technologies has played a substantial
role.
In our ﬁnal analysis we assess whether there are signiﬁcant diﬀerences in the prof-
itability and the output mix of eﬃcient and ineﬃcient commercial banks. Interestingly,




Total Deposits/TA -0.0765 -1.64
Total Loans/TA 0.7085 17.74∗
Equity Investments/TA 0.5239 3.13∗
Oﬀ-balance-sheet Items/TA 0.1470 5.76∗
Commission Revenue/TOI 0.5332 7.86∗
Total Securities/TA 0.1857 3.95∗
Price of funds 0.0088 0.93
Price of labour 0.5512 11.80∗
Price of buildings 0.4400 10.02∗
Dummy TA=2.5 1.1331 5.87∗
Dummy 2.5<TA=5 1.0757 2.68∗
Dummy 5<TA=7.5 1.0164 0.50
Dummy 10<TA=100 0.9283 -1.61
Dummy TA>100 1.0673 2.11∗
Dummy 1997 0.6418- 7 . 15∗
Dummy 1996 0.6839 -5.94∗
Dummy 1995 0.7730 -3.80∗
Dummy 1994 0.8125 -2.98∗
Adjusted R2 0.43
# banks on the cost frontier 200
# banks under the frontier with zero weight 38
∗ Signiﬁcant at the 95% conﬁdence level.
and in contrast with the savings banks results, the evidence presented in Table 14d o e s
not support the eﬃcient-structure hypothesis. Average return on equity was, on average,
similar for eﬃcient and ineﬃcient credit institutions. It appears that the return-on-equity
of savings banks is primarily driven by cost considerations, while the proﬁtability of com-
mercial banks must be aﬀected by diﬀerent factors as well. Further research is required to
explain this result. Note, however, that savings banks are usually smaller than commercial
banks. Perhaps they have less power to set prices than commercial banks. On the other
hand, smaller savings banks typically operate only in regions within countries so may have
33considerable market power in their relevant banking market.
The table also highlights that our regression technique RTFA, even for this diverse group
of commercial banks, was successful in classifying the sample into low-cost and high-cost
banks. Average cost for X-eﬃcient banks equaled 6.4 percent of the balance-sheet total,
while the cost of X-ineﬃcient banks which was on average 9.7 percent of the balance-sheet
total.
5C o n c l u s i o n
I nt h i sp a p e rw eh a v es t u d i e dt h ee ﬃciency of the European banking sector in the ﬁve-year
period following the implementation of the Second Banking Directive of European Union
(EU). The paper is the ﬁrst application of the new RTFA method which has been shown
to outperform the more standard SFA in case of realistic features in the data (Wagenvoort
et al. (2001). To make a comparison between EU countries more meaningful we have split
our sample into savings banks and commercial banks.
An o t e w o r t h yﬁrst ﬁnding is that commercial banks form a much more diverse group
than savings banks. Future studies should keep account of the possibility that subsets
of EU commercial banks oﬀer services of diﬀerent nature and use a diﬀerent technology.
Vander Vennet (2002)’s analysis conﬁrms this picture. It could also be that a close look at
ownership characteristics could be a fruitful approach to investigating better the determi-
nants of eﬃciency.
We conﬁrm the standard result for EU and international eﬃciency studies that man-
agerial ability to control costs (X-ineﬃciency) is at 17-25 percent the main source of in-
eﬃciency. There seems to be no evidence of improvement over time. We ﬁnd that big
commercial banks are on average more cost eﬃcient than small commercial banks, while
the same pattern does not show for savings banks. Reasons for this could be stricter share-
34holder monitoring or more competitive output markets for large commercial banks. The
level of X-eﬃciency diﬀers from country to country in Europe. Among the ﬁve big EU
countries only German bank managers have been successful on average in keeping costs
close to the eﬃcient frontier in the period 1993-1997; France performed around the EU
average; the UK perhaps slightly better than average; and Italy and Spain have been poor
performers.
Potential economies of scale can be attained in the savings bank sector. Choosing the
optimum scale could lead to a sector-wide cost reduction of about 3 percent. However, this
potential gain may be wasted in practice as an average large savings bank performs a little
worse than a small savings bank in terms of X-eﬃciency. Large commercial banks are on
average better run than small commercial banks. One explanation for this result is that
large commercial banks operate on a bigger scale and face more competitive pressure than
small (niche?) commercial banks.
Structural developments have had a notable impact on the EU banking sector. After
accounting for changes in output levels and input prices, we ﬁnd that both EU savings
banks and EU commercial banks lowered their cost base in the period 1993-1997 at an
annual pace of about 5 percent. It is diﬃcult to judge whether this result is due to techno-
logical progress, the direct eﬀect of deregulation in the EU, the impact of deregulation on
competition, or all of these factors. Stiroh (2000)’s and Berger and Mester’s (2001)r e s u l t s
of little or no technological progress in the period 1991-1997 in the US banking sector sug-
gests that deregulation, and not technological progress has played a crucial role. Moreover,
since X-ineﬃciency has been substantial during the sample period, and has not improved
over time, it is likely that deregulation has impacted the cost base of banks directly and
not through an increase in competitiveness in the EU banking markets.
Finally, eﬃcient banks and ineﬃcient bank diﬀer. Most importantly, eﬃcient savings
banks generate about 20 percent more proﬁts than ineﬃcient savings banks. They also
35attract more capital in the form of deposits and generate more income in the form of
commissions. Eﬃcient commercial banks incur only two-thirds of the costs of ineﬃcient
commercial banks, however they are not more proﬁtable than their ineﬃcient counterparts.
They are more often involved in oﬀ-balance-sheet activities and commission-generating
business than ineﬃcient commercial banks. They also hold more securities. These ﬁndings
seem to suggest that eﬃcient commercial banks are more often engaged in investment
banking activities, and might even be investment banks in disguise.
A Data Appendix
A.1 Selection of the bank samples
Our bank datasets are constructed using an update of BankScope that was issued at the end
of 1999. We selected all EU-15 ”savings banks” and ”commercial banks” that BankScope
deﬁnes as ’living’, and for which annual data for 1993-1997 is available.28
We set about preparing the two datasets in such a way they no longer contained banks
which had missing values for the components of total costs or one of the six output vari-
ables. In this process we also removed various obvious data errors and inconsistencies in
BankScope, and made sure banks were not counted twice. Finally, we homogenized the set
of commercial banks somewhat.
First, we removed banks with missing, zero or negative values for ’interest expenses’
or ’total operating expenses’ in a given year, banks for which individual balance sheet
items exceeded their respective balance-sheet total, and banks with a commission revenue
exceeding total operating incomes.
It is believed that both the consolidated entry for a bank and its unconsolidated entry
28In BankScope terms, we selected all ’consolidated statements’, ’unconsolidated statements’, and some
’aggregate statements’ (codes C1,C 2 ,U 1,U 2a n dA 1).
36(i.e. the banks main subsidiary that carries the same name) should only be included if
these statements are of a suﬃciently diﬀerent nature. Thus, we removed the entry for the
unconsolidated statement of a bank in case total assets on the unconsolidated statement
exceeded 70 percent of total assets on the corresponding consolidated statement.
In treating missing values for equity investments, oﬀ-balance sheet items and commis-
sion revenue, we employed the following guidelines. For companies with missing values in
not more than two out of ﬁve years, we replaced the missing value by the next value (or,
i nt h ec a s eo fam i s s i n gv a l u ef o r1997, by the 1996 value). Banks with more than two
but less than ﬁve missing values for any of these variables were removed altogether. For
UK companies with ﬁve missing values in oﬀ-balance sheet items, the missing value entries
were set to zero. In Greece, data on ”commission revenue” were not available, so we used
”net commission revenue” instead (Greek banks only report ”net commission revenue” =
”commission revenue” - ”commission expense”).
To homogenize the set of commercial banks, we removed a few banks with ‘oﬀ-balance
sheet items’ of more than twice the balance-sheet total. In addition, we decided to exclude
27 banks with total costs of less than 3% of total assets. After a careful study we believe
these banks to be pure investment banks.
A.2 The price data
Table 15s h o w st h eprice of funds in the EU member states. The price of funds represents
a weighted average of the real 3-month interbank oﬀered rate and the real deposit rate.
The weight of the deposit rate of an individual bank equals the value of deposits over
total assets; the weight of the interbank rate equals one minus the deposit rate weight.
The relevant deposit rates are extracted from the IMF (IFS dataset, Line 601), while the
interbank rate was retrieved from Datastream International. In Datastream we downloaded
37Table 15: Weighted average of the real interbank interest rate and the real deposit rate in
the EU-15 countries in the years 1993-1997, percentages (sources: IMF and Datastream
International)
Country 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Austria 0.40 0.12 0.59 0.33 0.72
Belgium 4.49 2.58 2.67 0.67 1.25
Denmark 6.08 2.05 2.29 0.94 0.66
Finland 4.20 3.13 3.28 2.26 1.31
France 3.92 3.36 3.40 1.75 2.29
Germany 1.96 1.87 2.11 1.411 .04
Greece 5.26 9.71 6.92 5.36 5.12
Ireland 2.23 -0.96 -1.00 -0.49 0.46
Italy 4.28 3.07 2.82 3.53 3.76
Luxembourg 2.152 . 9 1 3.06 2.122 . 0 8
Netherlands 1.14 1.98 2.47 1.411 .05
Portugal 4.72 3.96 4.48 3.35 2.71
Spain 5.39 2.18 3.23 2.78 2.23
Sweden 3.01 4.51 5.20 4.02 3.02
United Kingdom 2.86 1.62 1.29 1.32 1.23
monthly data on the 3-month interbank oﬀered rates in the EU-15 countries and used these
to create year-averages. Real rates were constructed by subtracting the relevant country’s
inﬂation rate from the computed nominal rates.
Table 16s h o w st h eprice of labour in the banking sector in each country. The price
of labour is constructed using BankScope and data published by the OECD. The 1996
and 1997 observations in each country are constructed using BankScope. We added up
all labour expenses of all banks in the sample in a given country and divided the sum by
the number of workers employed by these banks. A considerable number of banks report
the necessary data, however only for the years 1996 and 1997.29 The data for 1993-1995
is created by computing wage indices in the banking sector using the 1998 issue of ‘Bank
Proﬁtability’ of the OECD.30 This process delivered wage indices in the banking sector
29In the case of Ireland the ﬁgures are based on only three banks for 1996 and four for 1997.
30Bank Proﬁtability reports labour expenses in the banking sector and the total number of employees.
For some countries the data is not available for the banking sector as a whole, but merely for commer-
cial banks (Greece, Luxembourg, Portugal, Sweden and the UK ) or for commercial plus savings banks
38Table 16: Annual wage rate per bank employee in the EU-15 countries in the years 1993-
1997 (thousands of ECU) (sources: BankScope and OECD
Country 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Austria 47.2 49.2 54.3 55.2 56.2
Belgium 56.6 58.4 60.5 62.0 63.2
Denmark 46.2 47.9 50.9 53.2 54.3
Finland 29.8 32.6 33.0 37.4 35.9
France 53.7 53.3 54.6 56.8 59.6
Germany 43.1 44.3 48.0 49.2 51.6
Greece 23.3 24.9 27.3 30.6 33.2
Ireland 30.1 30.1 30.1 32.7 39.9
Italy 54.3 53.9 49.8 58.3 59.9
Luxembourg 55.0 61.0 64.6 64.8 65.1
Netherlands 37.5 40.9 45.6 49.0 56.6
Portugal 26.6 26.5 29.1 31.1 32.5
Spain 42.4 38.8 40.3 43.0 38.6
Sweden 40.3 40.4 46.8 53.9 57.6
United Kingdom 37.2 36.5 36.6 36.0 43.7
in the EU-15c o u n t r i e sf o r1993-1996, which were subsequently used to extrapolate the
B a n k S c o p ed a t at oc o v e rt h ep e r i o d1993 - 1996.
Table 17s h o w st h eprice of buildings in the banking sector in each country. The price
of buildings is created by taking a price index for newly delivered buildings and correcting
it for the relative price levels in each country. The data on newly delivered buildings
is obtained from Eurostat (CRONOS dataset, series /theme4/ construc/ isti08a/ i8aa
ind), and relative price levels are constructed from IMF data (IFS dataset: ’real eﬀective
exchange rate’).
B Theory Appendix
In this appendix we verify whether our estimated cost model (equation 1) is well speciﬁed.
Standard microeconomic textbooks show that the long-run cost curve should envelope
(Denmark).
39Table 17: The price index of buildings in the EU-15 countries in the years 1993-1997
(Germany, 1995 = 100) (sources: Eurostat and IMF
Country 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Austria 94 99 102 104 104
Belgium 87 90 91 93 94
Denmark 110 112 116 122 127
Finland 97 99 100 98 103
France 92 91 90 94 96
Germany 95 98 100 100 99
Greece 61 65 68 79 82
Ireland 74 74 74 78 88
Italy 71 72 66 76 80
Luxembourg 81 83 85 86 87
Netherlands 86 89 92 94 97
Portugal 57 60 61 65 67
Spain 69 69 70 76 75
Sweden 95 98 100 111 113
United Kingdom 68 71 68 73 93
the short-run cost curves. Thus, we ﬁrst show that the size dummies actually represent
(long-run) economies to scale by testing whether our estimated cost model envelopes the
short-run cost curves (i.e. the cost curves for given size classes).
Firstly, derive the cost output elasticity for an average ﬁrm in each size class. For





































The ﬁrst assumption holds for all but one output variable since outputs are taken from the
40balance-sheet. The second assumption states we can increase an individual output without
having to change another one.



























Using this equation and the equivalent equation for the other output, we can derive the






TC. This elasticity represent the change in cost

































Equation 7 shows that we can test the null hypothesis of (short-run) constant returns to
scale versus the alternative of decreasing returns to scale by testing whether the restriction







































This formula is extended in a straightforward way to cover our 6 outputs case. Notice that
alternative hypothesis of (short-run) decreasing returns to scale is identical to the situation
that short-run cost curve is enveloped by the estimated cost model of equation 1 in the
main text.
Table 18 contains the elasticities and concomitant F-tests for the average ﬁrm in each
size class. We ﬁnd the F-test leads to rejections for all cases, that is the data reveal
short-run decreasing returns to scale for banks in each size class for both savings banks
and commercial banks. Hence, our estimated augmented Cobb-Douglas frontiers represent
long-run curves, and, consequently, the size dummies represent economies of scale. We have
41Table 18: Short-run output elasticities and the relevant F-test statistics. [F(1,∞)=3 .84
at the 5 percent level]
Size class Savings Banks Commercial Banks
Elasticity F-test Elasticity F-test
TA≤2.5 2.03 16770.16 1.90 3834.69
2.5<TA≤5 1.90 12504.81 1.92 4343.33
5<TA≤7.5 1.79 9944.66 2.155 102.01
7.5<TA≤10 1.66 7979.69 2.06 1867.63
10<TA≤100 1.80 7736.61 2.31 7523.68
TA>100 1.80 4575.70 1.79 2446.76
also established decreasing returns to scale for the largest savings banks and commercial
banks in the datasets (not shown in Table 18). This shows that our cost frontier is not
downward-sloping beyond the threshold value of 100 billion ECU that deﬁnes the class of
largest credit institutions.
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